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THE BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT
AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT
Edward Foster*
The last decade has seen a continuing effort to amend the Constitution to limit spending by the federal government, require an
annually balanced federal budget, or both. The proposed amendment would have a big impact on the economy, and many economists have spoken out on the subject, mostly in opposition, but
some in support.
Two related concerns lie behind the movement. First, many
people believe that federal spending is excessive. It grew from 3%
of total output in 1929 to 13% in 1947 (its low point between the
high defense spending of the war years and the domestic spending
of the post-war years). The post-war peak was 24.9% in 1982. In
1984, it stood at 24% of output. Opposition to large government
stems from (nineteenth century) liberal political philosophy. The
economists who support the amendment generally share that philosophy. But part of their justification is more narrowly economic,
based on concerns about economic efficiency. High taxes sap incentives, distort economic choices, and waste resources on tax reduction schemes. On the spending side of the budget, the size of the
income flows controlled by government encourages us all to compete for our share, wasting resources in the process.
The second concern underlying the amendment is deficit
spending. The federal government ran surpluses in seven of the
fourteen years after World War II, from 1947 to 1960, but it has
done so only once since then, in 1969. Meanwhile, the size of deficits has grown, from an average of 1% of output in the 1960's to
5% today. Opposition to deficits arises mainly from their link to
high spending. Deficit finance allows the society to spend while
avoiding the hard political issue of who will pay. Some economists
are also opposed to the use of deficit spending to help cure unem• Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota. Many of the authors cited here,
and University of Minnesota colleagues, have commented on an earlier draft. The author
thanks them for their kindness and absolves them from responsibility-particularly because
he did not accept all of their suggestions.
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ployment, on the ground that it is in the long run ineffective or even
counterproductive.
In the rest of this paper I describe the reasoning that has led
some economists to support the amendment, outline the counterarguments from the literature, and end with a brief evaluation of
the debate. I First, though, here is a brief summary of where the
constitutional amendment stands with respect to passage, and a description of the most widely supported amendment proposal in the
Ninety-ninth Congress.
Since 1975, most of the amendment effort has been focused on
a campaign to persuade thirty-four states to call for a constitutional
convention. At least initially the expectation was that the threat of
such a convention would persuade Congress to pass its own resolution for submission to the states. So far thirty-two states have
passed resolutions. They differ in content from state to state, and
some are now a decade old. Hence, Congress might not consider
itself bound to call a convention following action by two more
state'\.
Congress has not, however, ignored this pressure. A proposed
amendment passed the Senate in 1982, but failed to win the required two-thirds majority in the House.2 A balanced budget proposal was passed out of the Senate Judiciary Committee in
September 1984, but did not reach a floor vote. (A drive in the
House to force a similar proposal out of committee fell short but
received 190 of the 216 signatures needed.) Proponents appear undeterred. New joint resolutions were introduced in both the House
and the Senate on January 3, 1985. The proposal summarized below had ninety-nine House sponsors; the corresponding Senate proposal had thirty-four. Seventeen variations have also been offered in
the House, and three in the Senate.
Much of the impetus for this amendment arises from a tradition that is more interested in limiting the growth of government
than in balancing the budget. But balancing the budget wins all the
popular support, so most proposed amendments link the two. Here
are the features of the most widely supported proposal:
Section 1: Congress shall adopt a budget for each fiscal year in which projected
1. Economists in general have wisely avoided analysis of the legal issues involved in
the adoption and implementation of such an amendment, and so will I. For that discussion,
see The Balanced Budget Amendment: An Inquiry Into Appropriateness, 96 HARV. L. REv.
1600 (1983).
2. Senate approval may have been more in response to the political embarrassment of
the day than to the rumblings from the state capitols. At least one editorial writer thought
so: ''The immediate motive here is wretchedly trivial-to provide a little shelter for a conservative Senate as it raises the federal debt limit." Washington Post, June 21, 1982, at A 12.
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receipts are at least as great as projected outlays, unless a three-fifths vote of both
houses approves a deficit. Congress and the President are both charged with responsibility to ensure that actual outlays do not exceed those projected.
Section 2: Total receipts shall not increase faster than national income increased in
the preceding (calendar) year, unless approved by a majority vote of both houses (in
the Senate version), or a 3/5 vote of both houses (in the House version), and signed
into law by the President.
Section 3: The President shall each year submit a budget consistent with the provisions of Sections I and 2.
Section 4: The provisions of the amendment may be waived in case of a declaration of war.
Section 5: Total receipts and outlays are defined to be inclusive (except for borrowed receipts and outlays to repay debt).
Section 6: Congress shall enforce and implement the amendment by appropriate
legislation.
Section 7: The amendment will take effect for the second fiscal year beginning
after ratification. 3

Without plunging into an analysis of the potential economic
impact of this proposal, I will point out that it does not call for
what most people would call a balanced budget. It says only that
(escape clause aside), initial plans must call for a balanced budget,
and that spending must be held to the level of those plans. But a
shortfall in receipts compared to expectations could still lead to a
deficit. Moreover, at least according to analysis by the Congressional Budget Office, the amendment might contain a second escape
clause in that it does not specify a penalty if no budget at all is
adopted.4
I

The main economic case for a balanced budget amendment
rests on an analysis of the incentives facing government officials.
The analysis has generally concluded that overspending and waste
in government are inevitable. Two distinct paths have led to that
conclusion. One says that government officials are not to be trusted
to carry out the will of the voters; the other says that the voters
themselves are not to be trusted.
A

The topic is a novel one for English-speaking economists, dating back only to the 1950's as a subject for systematic inquiry. As a
branch of economics, before 1950 public finance meant primarily
the analysis of how the public would respond to government ac3. H.R J. Res. 27, and S. J. Res. 13, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
4. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BALANCING THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND LIMITING FEDERAL SPENDING: CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY APPROACHES, ]932-36, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1982).
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tions. The incentives facing government officials were not analyzed;
the officials were implicitly treated as automatons whose only objective was to further the public welfare. American public finance theory ignored an earlier European tradition in economic and political
thought, which took a more jaundiced view of public officials and
their motivation. The "public choice" theorists, who are now employing economic theory to analyze the behavior of government,
have brought that literature back to our attention.s
From nineteenth century European economics, the work that
has had the most impact on public choice theory is K.nut Wicksell's
A New Principle of Just Taxation, published in German in 1896 and
translated into English only in 1958.6 Wicksell was the precursor of
today's public choice economists in thinking about how to design
rules for public decision making, taking account of the incentives of
decisionmakers. In order to avoid coercion of dissenting minorities,
which he considered the most unattractive feature of majority rule,
Wicksell proposed two features for adoption of any spending
proposal:
(i) Each spending bill should specify the proposed distribution of
taxes to pay for it.
(ii) No such bill shall be adopted without "virtual unanimity" in
the legislature. 1
The required majority might be three-fourths, five-sixths or even
nine-tenths. Wicksell observed that "absolute unanimity may have
to be ruled out for practical reasons"; otherwise he would have preferred it. The proposal was intended to assure that negotiations
would have to continue until essentially every interest group judged
that an expenditure's benefits outweigh its costs. Both elements reappear, watered down, in current proposals.
Problems of public choice have attracted increasing attention
since Buchanan's rediscovery of Wicksell's work. Here is a sketch
of a theory that is general enough to encompass most of this work.s
1.

People will voluntarily devote their energies to pro-

5. Buchanan, Public Finance and Public Choice, 28 NAT. TAX. J. 383 (1975).
6. CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 72 (R. Musgrave & A. Peacock ed.
1958). Translated by Buchanan; see supra note 5, at 393 for an account of the influence
Wicksell's paper had on Buchanan's career (and therefore on the development of the field of
public choice).
7. CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 6, at 88-90. Richard E.
Wagner, in an unpublished paper, has pointed out that Wicksell's understanding of the issue
is deeper and more subtle than is suggested in the translated portion of his work. See R.
Wagner, Limiting Government Spending: Alternative Constitutional Perspectives (1979)
(Florida State University typescript).
8. The following summary loosely follows T. ANDERSON & P. HILL, THE BIRTH OF A
TRANSFER SOCIETY 4-11 (1980).
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ductive activity only when they expect a direct return.
Society's output will generally be higher, the closer
the link between effort and reward. Output will be
highest if each person can expect to receive the full
fruits of his or her own labor, as happens in a
smoothly functioning competitive market system.9
2. The link between a person's effort and reward depends on the existence of a system of well-specified
property rights and a government to enforce those
rights.
3. The government that defines and enforces property
rights enjoys discretion in how to do so. It can favor
some groups over others; as a special case it can favor
those who govern.
4. With any system of government, those who govern
have an incentive to extract wealth from the economic
system, either directly in cash or perquisites, or indirectly through expenditures that secure their tenure in
office or expand their power.
To summarize, the need for government to have power to define
and protect property rights invites government to collect too much,
spending some of it for the benefit of the governors rather than for
the benefit of the governed.
5.

Government's power to define property rights creates
a new avenue for the pursuit of wealth. Possible
mechanisms for enrichment through government action include tax relief, government-defined monopolies, subsidies, and regulatory changes. Moreover,
because benefits are usually concentrated and costs
usually diffused, political resistance to the creation of
special privilege is rarely effective.Io

These attempts to influence government can lead to excessive government spending (especially transfer payments). They can also
lead to excessive government meddling that shows up in the complexity of the tax code, in regulation of economic activity, in cumbersome eligibility rules for subsidies. The effect is to erode
property rights and the efficiency of the economic system.
9. We put aside some refinements of theory that deal with circumstances of market
failure, such as pollution and other external effects of private activities, in which Adam
Smith's invisible hand may lead us in the wrong direction.
10. Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & EcoN. 211
(1976), proposes a formal theory for this phenomenon.
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Finally, to complicate the problem, even if society
generally recognizes that government has become too
big and too powerful, normal political channels of redress are unlikely to succeed. So little of the benefit
from reform is returned to the individual reformer
personally, that no rational person would make the
effort.

Like any other academic group, public choice theorists are diverse and contentious; some could surely dissent from this formulation. But this sketch does accurately reflect, I think, the general
spirit of public choice theory.
An important goal of public choice theory has been to explain
the growth in government spending as a percentage of total national
income, in the U.S. and other countries since World War 11.11
Addressing that question, Buchanan and Wagner argue that
unbalanced budgets are among the chief villains.12 Beginning in colonial times, the U.S. enjoyed an unrecognized blessing: the entrenched belief that unbalanced budgets are immoral-a belief so
firmly, and generally, held that it could properly be called part of
the country's fiscal constitution. The result of this belief was that,
while war or crisis might produce deficits, subsequent periods of
peace and prosperity would produce surpluses that would retire
much of the debt. This idyllic situation was ruined by economists
who favored deficits when needed to stimulate deficient demand,
and surpluses only when needed to restrain excess demand. Politicians, brought up to fear the consequences of deficits and government debt, heard only the more palatable part of that lesson: deficit
finance is not a sin. Buchanan and Wagner blame the economics
profession for not having foreseen this result, as we would have if
we had given even a moment's thought to the incentives facing
those politicians.'3
Another set of explanations for why government grows has
been developed from Niskanen's theory of the interaction between
legislators and bureaucrats.l4 The theory hinges on the information
gap between legislators, who control the size of agency budgets, and
II. For a thorough survey, see Larkey, Stolp & Winer, Theorizing About the Growth of
Government: A Research Assessment, I J. PuB. POLICY !57 (1981).
12. J. BUCHANAN, & R. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF LoRD KEYNES (1977).
13. Milton Friedman has also singled out deficits as a major part of the problem, because they allow legislators to enjoy the political benefits of spending without paying the
political cost of explicitly distributing the obligations to pay the bills. The argument directly
echoes Wicksell. See Wall Street Journal, April 26, 1984, at 12.
14. W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).
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the bureaucrats who administer the agencies. Legislators lack the
detailed understanding of the internal functioning of each agency to
be able to measure its efficiency of operation. Bureaucrats, rewarded for the size of their empire rather than for their parsimony,
can misrepresent the level of spending needed to attain any given
level of service, and thereby extract approval of expenditures larger
than needed. Hence, even if legislators were to act as perfectly loyal
public servants, government would waste money because legislators
could never learn enough to root out waste.
Various other partial explanations of the expansion of government spending have also been offered:
1.

2.

3.
4.

Expansion of voting rights to include more poor people and expansion of the number of (voting) government employees both create constituencies who are
beneficiaries of expanded government.
The government's ability to control the agenda in
public referenda on some issues means that the outcome preferred by government can be made the least
unpalatable among the choices offered to the voters.
The imbalance for each specific program between concentrated benefits and dispersed costs creates opportunities for log-rolling and pork-barrel vote trading.
Coupled with this imbalance, legislators lack program-specific information; they therefore become receptive to the one-sided information provided by
lobbyists.

To what extent have these explanations been subjected to critical scrutiny and withstood careful empirical testing? Larkey, Stolp
and Winer give the literature a low mark:
We are impressed with how much has been written and how little is known about
why government grows. . . . The theories and empirical work reviewed in this
paper are rudimentary. None of the theoretical work is sufficiently developed and
tested to be persuasive as a positive theory or useful as a prescriptive theory. IS

The assessment is probably correct. Yet some of the accumulating
evidence does provide general support for the public choice view
that government officials act in their own self-interest, and that this
leads to overspending.t6 Whether these developments help to justify a balanced budget amendment is another question.
15.
16.

Larkey, Stolp & Winer, supra note II, at 202.
Frey, The Public Choice Approach to the Explanation of Collective Consumption, in
THE GRANTS &ONOMY AND COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION 43 (R. Matthews & G. Stafford
ed. 1982), gives a good survey.

360

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 2:353

B

Developments in other areas of economics also bear on the
question of the balanced budget amendment. Closest in spirit to the
public choice work is the work by Stigler and his colleagues on the
economics of government regulation. Previously, economists
tended to treat government regulation as a panacea for market imperfections. A series of empirical studies by Stigler and others starting in the early 1960's showed the naivete of this view; in fact, the
regulatory agency often seems to have been "captured" by those
regulated. 11 According to one assessment, the impact of this work
has been "to put public interest theories of politics to rest," so that
they are now "viewed as normative wishings, rather than explanations of real world phenomena."1s
Further support comes from persuasive recent work by Olson. 19 He started to investigate the difference in growth rates between the "new" region of the South and West and the "old" of the
North and East in the U.S. He was led to a hypothesis for which he
found broad support across many centuries and many parts of the
world. Old societies become rigid because so many deals have been
struck. There is such a delicate balancing of opposing political and
economic interests that they become immobilized and adaptation to
change becomes impossible. The variety of cases Olson finds in support of the model is striking.
Similar support has come from work in economic development
that analyzed the costs of government tampering in the economy to
encourage investment and protect local manufacturers. An unintended effect of this government intervention is to divert resources
in the private sector from productive activities to competition for
government favors. Profits in the form of government favors are
every bit as attractive as other profits, and such "rent seeking" or
"directly-unproductive profit seeking" will continue to absorb resources until the recipient of the government favor enjoys a net income no higher than he could obtain from directly productive
activities.2o Here the resource waste is generally not within government, but is brought about by government activity (and in turn generates further government spending to respond to the lobbying
17. G. STIGLER, THE EcONOMIST AND THE STATE (1975). See also Pe1tzman, supra
note 10.
18. Ka1t & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AMER.
EcoN. REv. 279 (1984).
19. M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982).
20. For references see Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575 (1982).
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pressures, choose among competing supplicants for largesse, and so
on).
Another related development is Liebenstein's concept of x-efficiency, so named because he could not think of a suitable adjective.2' The phenomenon under discussion is the opportunity
provided by monopoly-by lack of competitive pressure-to be
inefficient, to use cumbersome, high-cost methods of production because they are convenient for the manager, or simply due to his
indifference to costs he does not bear. The argument mirrors Alchian's argument that a competitive system can produce reasonably
efficient results in spite of itself, even with stupid or uncaring managers in charge. Alchian argued that the relatively inefficient get
weeded out by Darwinian competition. His analogy:
Assume that thousands of travelers set out from Chicago, selecting their roads completely at random and without foresight. Only our "economist" knows that on but
one road are there any gasoline stations. He can state categorically that travelers
will continue to travel only on that road; those on other roads will soon run out of
gas.22

Monopoly means that there is no Darwinian pressure to be efficient,
and a monopolist who is not motivated to hold costs down is unlikely to do so. A considerable body of empirical evidence has been
mustered for Liebenstein's view. Its relevance for the present discussion is that government agencies are the quintessential monopoly
suppliers of services, and their managers often may not receive personal rewards for efficiency.
The work discussed so far bears on why society might benefit
by choosing to constrain itself to balance its government's budget
annually. An analogous body of work explores why a single individual might wish to constrain his own behavior in advance so that
he could not later succumb to temptation. Everyday examples of
this type of behavior include having automatic checking account
deductions for a Christmas club account that pays no interest or
asking other family members not to bring candy into the house.
The issue of economic theory is posed by supposing an individual
makes a plan today for his future behavior. If he reconsiders tomorrow, will he voluntarily abide by the plan? The answer in general is "no"--even if the initial choice was carefully made,
consistent with his own preferences, and no new information has
become available. Plans to diet always begin tomorrow; on reconsideration the next day, an additional day of delay always seems
21. H. LIEBENSTEIN, BEYOND EcONOMIC MAN 29-47 (1976).
22. Alchian, Uncertainty. Evolution and Economic Theory, 58 J.
(1950), at 214.

PouT. EcoN.
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equally reasonable. Someone who recognizes his own lamentable
tendency to revise his own plans in this way might wish to commit
himself to live by today's plan. Society as a whole might display the
same human tendency to postpone pain that some of us display as
individuals; the balanced budget amendment could then be justified
as a social equivalent to the Christmas club that helps bind us to
frugality.23
So far, the discussion has concerned the economics of spending, rather than that of deficits. Although deficits are related to
overspending, they also involve distinct economic issues. First,
there is an issue of whether economists approve of deficits as a tool
of macroeconomic policy. We must distinguish between deficits as
a steady diet and as an occasional Keynesian response to recession.
If there is any issue on which economists are united, it is in disapproval of continual large deficits. There is, however, disagreement
on continual small deficits even in periods of prosperity. A growing
economy needs a growing money supply, and government deficits
can provide that money supply. The printing press provides a modern kind of seigniorage, a mechanism for channeling a modest level
of funding to the state without the economic distortions occasioned
by taxation. But some fear that small deficits inevitably grow to
large ones; to them, the risk outweighs the benefit.
There is also disagreement on occasional deficits as a response
to recession. A large majority of the profession continues to follow
Keynes in believing that government programs to stimulate demand, generating deficits in the process, are appropriate in the face
of high unemployment. But each recent recession appears to have
brought successively higher levels of unemployment in the next recovery. That brute fact, coupled with an attractive theory to explain it (the theory of rational expectations) has converted an
increasing fraction of the profession, particularly its younger members, to a new view: The public learns to anticipate government
policy and to tailor their own actions to it, with the result that government policy becomes increasingly ineffective and even
counterproductive.
The last part of the above sentence is most controversial. For
those who accept it, though, the conclusion leads to the view that
simple rules of macroeconomic policy, followed consistently (e.g.,
23.

I have not seen this issue linked to the balanced budget amendment in the literature;

I am grateful to my colleague Neil Wallace for pointing out the possible connection, in con-

versation. The first discussion of the issue is found in Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in
Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. EcoN. STUD. 165 (1956). See also Schelling, SelfCommand in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice, 74 AMER. EcoN. REV. l
(May 1984).
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annually balanced budgets), will in the long run perform better than
will a policy of active intervention. This position is a descendent of
one advocated for the last third of a century by Milton Friedman,
who has argued against professional hubris in attempting to manage
the economy: Even if policy makers try to be helpful, they are more
likely to destabilize than to stabilize the economy's performance,
simply because they are so clumsy.24
The new argument, however, is more subtle. It hinges on a
simple fact about negotiations. In a series of negotiations, if you
always "let bygones by bygones," and act to make the best of the
current situation without punishing your opponent for past misdeeds, you have no way to keep him from similar misdeeds in the
future. Any parent who has threatened punishment to a child who
then disobeys, has faced the problem. Should you proceed with the
punishment? It cannot undo the past act, and you will not enjoy
administering it-but it might discourage similar disobedience in
the future. If I ignore the trespassers picnicking at my vacation
cabin I will have a more tranquil weekend than if I confront them,
but I may regret it as the news spreads.
The problem in both cases is that the opponent forms expectations about future response from current behavior. You may be
better off to bind yourself to actions that are not in your immediate
best interest, to help shape your opponent's conduct. The issue is a
general one in adversary relationships, and it arises in
macroeconomic policy. Once the operation of the economic system
has led to a recession, it is in the government's immediate best interest to use deficits to cure it. But if private agents in the economy
rationally come to expect that the government will always bail them
out of recession, their decisions on prices, wage rates, and all aspects of their contracts will be based on that expectation, possibly
leading to poorer economic performance than if the threat of recession were always present. Kydland and Prescott have explicitly
suggested a balanced budget amendment as a way to solve that
problem.2s
A second body of macroeconomic research related to the balanced budget issue is the rapidly growing literature on the "political
Friedman, A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability, 38 AMER.
245 (1948).
25. See Kydland & Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. PouT. EcoN. 473 (1977), and Dynamic Optimal Taxation, Rational Expectations and Optimal Control, 2 J. EcoN. DYNAMICS & CoNTROL 79 (1980). For an accessible
introduction to the rational expectations literature as it relates to economic policy questions,
see Sargent & Wallace, Rational Expectations and the Theory of Economic Policy, in RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND EcONOMETRIC PRACTICE 199 (R. Lucas & T. Sargent ed.
1981).
24.

EcoN. REV.

364

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 2:353

business cycle." The notion is that at least part of the driving force
for business cycles in democratic societies is manipulation of the
economy by the party in power prior to each election, in order to
maximize their chance for reelection--despite costs to the economy
that will be paid later. This hypothesis has considerable empirical
support, which lends further strength to the general claim that government officials are hardly disinterested. It could serve directly to
justify a balanced budget amendment in order to limit the opportunity for such manipulation.26
D

Even granting the wickedness or clumsiness of government, it
does not necessarily follow that a constitutional amendment is the
appropriate remedy. Most of the arguments summarized above,
from the public choice and related literature, suggest simply that
government spends too much or spends on the wrong things.
Others argue that government spends too much primarily because
deficits are allowed.27 Less frequent arguments are made against
deficits, and against any activist fiscal policy, independent of the
level at which the budget is balanced.2s The latter argument, as
advanced by Kydland and Prescott, offers the most direct link between the diagnosis and the proposed remedy. Government, in
their view, needs to bind its future behavior for strategic reasons, to
persuade other players in the macroeconomic "game" that recession
is a real possibility, even an ever-present threat, in our economic
life. Wagner has argued, too, that a balanced budget amendment
would abolish the political business cycle.29 With these exceptions,
the "scholarly" public choice literature is generally limited to diagnosis; it does not discuss remedy.
Granted that we want to limit spending or deficits, why should
it be done by constitutional amendment? In published debate on the
amendment itself, I have seen four arguments that address the issue.
26. See Alt, Political Business Cycles in Britain, in MODELS OF PoLmCAL EcONOMY
155 (P. Whiteley ed. 1980), and Locksley, The Political Business Cycle: Alternative Interpretations, id. at 177. These introductions do not point out, though, that the theory conflicts
with the rational expectations view discussed above. That view would suggest that people
cannot systematically be fooled by short-term policies that carry longer-term costs, as the
"political business cycle" would suggest. On this issue, see Minford & Peel, The Political
Theory of the Business Cycle, 17 EuR. EcoN. REV. 253 (1982).
27. J. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, supra note 12, and Friedman, supra note 13.
28. Friedman, supra note 24, and Kydland & Prescott, supra note 25.
29. Wagner, &anomie Manipulation for Political Profit: Macroeconomic Consequences
and Constitutional Implications, 30 KYKLOS 395 (1977), explicitly recommends the balanced
budget amendment as protection against the political business cycle. Buchanan and Wagner's argument also suggests the importance of making deficits unacceptable.
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First, as between legislation and constitutional amendment, legislation does not work. One Congress cannot bind the next, and we
have a documented history of failed attempts either to limit expenditure growth or to balance the budget through legislation. We
need stronger medicine.3o
Second, and more persuasive, is an argument that comes from
what Wildavsky has called the Pogo theory of overspending ("We
have looked upon the enemy and he is us"). To the extent that
government spending is due to logrolling, vote trading, and special
deals with concentrated benefits but diffuse costs, we find it impossible in the ordinary course of political life to negotiate a joint reduction in spending that would benefit us all. Instead we all go on
protecting our own little share of government largesse. This is a
classic example of the prisoners' dilemma game, in which two prisoners would both benefit from remaining silent, but both confess
because neither can afford to take the risk that the other will strike a
deal with the police. In the government spending version, all would
profit from a mutual pact to end the special deals that together burden the economy with inefficiency. Yet each separately would profit
from violating that agreement, if all other players held to it; and so
all suffer for lack of a mechanism to bind each player to the behavior that would benefit all. A constitutional amendment offers a
mechanism to escape that dilemma.3I
The third argument for adopting a balanced budget amendment as a means to control runaway government is based on a historical observation, coupled with crossed fingers. Though Hobbes
saw unlimited government as the only alternative to anarchy, history offers significant counterexamples:
Historically, governments do seem to have been held in check by constitutional
rules. . . . (O]ur whole construction is based on the belief, or faith . . . that tax
rules imposed within a constitution will prevaiJ.32

30. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BALANCED BUDGET-TAX LIMITATION
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, Rep. No. 151, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1981). I do not
find the legislative history of attempts to control spending as conclusive as do some of the
amendment's supporters; in particular the legislation that was later ignored seems in some
cases to have been slipped through by blackmail, as amendments to crucial bills, with no
general commitment in Congress to support it.
31. The "prisoners' dilemma" argument has been used by several proponents of the
balanced budget amendment. I prefer the exposition of A. WILDA VSKY, How TO LIMIT
GovERNMENT SPENDING 2 ( 1980). Another useful discussion is given by Riker, Constitu·
tiona/ Limitations as Self-Denying Ordinances, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BUDGET 85
(W. Moore & R. Penner ed. 1980).
32. G. BRENNAN & I. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 10 (I 980).
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Finally, some of those who support an amendment acknowledge that the first attempt might not work:
It is possible, even likely, that the constitutional limitations will not work any better
than . . . other constraints have. It is typical that agreements to resolve prisoners'
dilemmas are broken time and again until a satisfactory solution is found.33

I believe that proponents would all argue that despite this risk it is
important at least to try. One argument for at least making the
effort is that even an unsuccessful effort to forestall may defuse the
anger of the voters who might otherwise do something really
crazy.34 Some see continuing budget deficits, and continued expansion of government spending, as leading to inflation that threatens
the stability of society. If so, the risk that the proposed constitutional solution might fail is hardly a risk at all, for the alternative is
so much worse. "Should we not look for genuine institutional reform within the structure of democratic decision making rather
than for changes that replace this structure?"3s
II

The mainstream "response" to be summarized here is primarily criticism of the proposed balanced budget amendment, not of the
theory of public choice that I have summarized above. However, I
am aware of two global objections that have been advanced against
that theory, and I will review those here. There are also objections
to the conclusion that the government spends more than people
want it to, and to the Buchanan-Wagner thesis that our fall from
grace started with Keynes. I will briefly review those objections,
too, before describing the specific objections economists have advanced against the balanced budget amendment.36
A

The theory of public choice rests on the assumption of selfinterested behavior by all of the actors in the political process.
North has pointed out that many aspects of behavior crucial to the
33. Riker, supra note 31, at 89-90.
34. This argument was advanced by one who had watched a similar sequence in California: Governor Reagan in 1973 proposed an amendment to the state constitution to limit
taxes and spending. The proposal was defeated, but perhaps as a result, the financially capricious Proposition 13 was passed five years later. See Meltsner, Budget Control Through Political Action, in THE FEDERAL BUDGET: EcONOMICS AND POLITICS 315 (M. Boskin & A.
Wildavsky ed. 1982).
35. Buchanan & Wagner, supra note 12, at 91.
36. To do justice to the present controversy in macroeconomics, which as explained
above bears on the debate over the balanced budget amendment, is beyond the scope of this
review, the competence of the reviewer, and-no doubt-the patience of the reader.
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political process cannot be explained by that assumption-from
voting (after all, no one expects his vote to be decisive in any election), to support of voluntary organizations from which there is at
most a negligible prospect for personal gain, to acts of individual
sacrifice and heroism. Many forms of action that lead to social
change and many forms of inaction that lead to social stability require some explanation beyond simple self-interest.37
Public choice theory is obviously, and crucially, incomplete
until we learn to incorporate other motivations, notably those with
ideological roots. As an argument against the balanced budget
amendment, this objection need not be telling. A constitution
should protect us against the worst impulses of the most selfish rulers, so even acknowledgement that the theory is partially valid can
help justify the need for constitutional protection.Js
The second objection to the theory is intended specifically to
warn against drawing potential policy conclusions. Musgrave
points out that the conclusion, "government is not to be trusted,"
springs directly from the basic premise that government officials are
interested only in their own welfare. One cannot leap from that
theory to policy recommendations, without more information on
the validity of the theory, to help us to judge the value of what we
would gain compared to what we would lose.39
The explanations offered by public choice theorists for the rise
in government spending over time are particularly relevant to our
present topic, because they are so often cited to justify the urgent
need for spending limits and a balanced budget. These explanations
have not fared well in scholarly debate, although the general verdict
is that they are unproven but not necessarily false. With respect to
Buchanan and Wagner's view that Keynesian economic policies
have led to runaway government spending, Donald F. Gordon observes that the trend to increased government spending started well
before Keynes (with generally balanced budgets), and that during
the truly "Keynesian" period of American policy the ratio of government debt to GNP has fallen dramatically.40 Furthermore, the
37. D. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN EcONOMIC HISfORY 11 (1981). Kalt &
Zupan, supra note 18, give concrete evidence that ideology helps account for U.S. Senate
votes on stripmining regulation.
38. Brennan & Buchanan, Monopoly in Money and Inflation, 88 HOBART PAPERS 23
(1981).
39. Musgrave, Leviathan Cometh-Or Does He?, in TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS 77 (H. Ladd & T. Tideman ed. 1981). He offers enough particulars to make credible
the claim that the necessary testing has not yet been done.
40. Gordon, Debts. Keynes, and Our Present Discontents, 4 J. MoNET. EcoN. 583
(1978). The same observation has been made by others, but it is in pan misleading: While
GNP increases with inflation, the face value of outstanding debt does not. Prices have in-
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growth in government spending since 1960 has been primarily in
state and local, rather than in federal, spending;4t and debt increases have been associated with shortfalls of revenue, rather than
increases in spending. 42
The logic of Buchanan and Wagner's position has also been
challenged. They claim, first, that voters are generally ill-informed
because it is not in anyone's self-interest to become an informed
voter; and second, that politicians, and voters, listened to just half
of the Keynesian lesson. Meckling asks what model of democratic
participation makes it worthwhile for voters to learn just half of the
Keynesian lesson, so that they become willing to accept deficits uncritically, when before they were content to believe uncritically that
a balanced budget was best for the economy. 43 Olson observes that
while taxes are unpopular, so is inflation. Why does the self-interest
of politicians drive them to shelter voters from the former rather
than from the latter?44 The argument requires a more careful specification of what information voters are assumed to have, either
based on surveys or on a more fully developed theory of voter
behavior.
B

There are sins of commission, and sins of omission. I think
that mainstream economists' most important objection to the
amendment is its attempt to protect against the first, at the risk of
bringing about the second. The budget must project outlays twenty
months into the future. With the amendment in place, a determined minority in Congress could prevent action in any emergency
that had not been foreseen when the budget was drawn up. Recession, natural disaster, famine, or military threat could confront us,
but unless there were extraordinary agreement on the proper course
of action, prompt government reaction to the emergency would be
barred. The mainstream of the profession accepts the potential for
waste as an unfortunate cost of government operation, but opts for
preserving its freedom to act. 45
Another objection is that the amendment would be ineffective.
creased five-fold since the end of World War II and account for the increase in GNP relative
to debt.
41. Meckling, Comment, in FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 101 (J. Buchanan & R. Wagner ed. 1978).
42. Musgrave, supra note 39, at 93.
43. Meckling, supra note 41.
44. Olson, Comment, supra note 41, at 106.
45. Ackley, You Can't Balance the Budget By Amendment, CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec.
1982, at 4.
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The military draft is the most obvious illustration that government
has means other than expenditures to accomplish its goals. If imaginative accounting could not circumvent any specific laws intended
to implement the amendment, other government actions (tax deductions, regulations) could do so.46 Moreover, bureaucrats are
past masters at focusing budgetary pressures on their most popular
expenditures, rather than on the marginal ones. 47 The end result
could match the disaster of the prohibition amendment. 4s
From a technical point of view, there would be formidable
problems of implementation. The proposed amendment calls for
limiting actual outlays to those budgeted. The current budget process does not directly control outlays, and they cannot even be forecast with precision. If economic growth is slower than expected, if
interest rates, retirements, or inflation are higher than expected,
outlays will be higher than expected. Under current laws, much of
the adjustment is automatic, and some of these automatic adjustments are virtually unavoidable (e.g., the response of Social Security
payments to the number retired, or the response of interest payments to interest rates).49 Implementation of the amendment would
require either building some padding into projected outlays, so that
they would become less informative, or else occasional emergency
spending cuts at the expense of society's current needs.
An interesting perspective on the proposed amendment comes
from Herbert Stein, who has argued that controls on the deficit
should be legislative rather than constitutional. The chief economic
impact of the deficit is on economic growth, through its effect on
private capital formation, because newly issued government debt
crowds out private borrowing for investment. We should control
deficits, if we want higher growth. But growth means presenting a
gift to our children. We abstain from consuming all our harvest so
that they may consume even bigger harvests in the future. The
judgment of how much of society's resources should be directed to
current uses and how much directed to growth, for the benefit of
descendants, is one that each generation is entitled to make for itself. Part of the decision is taken away from future generations if
46. Mcintyre, Discretionary Control of the Federal Budget, in THE CoNSTITUTION AND
THE BUDGET, supra note 31, at 57, and MacLaury, Constitutional vs. Discretionary Constraints, id. at 63.
47. Laband, Federal Budget Cuts: Bureaucrats Trim the Meat, Not the Fat, 41 Pus.
CHOICE 311 (I 983 ).
48. Olson, Is the Balanced Budget Amendment Another Form of Prohibition?, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE BUDGET, supra note 31, at 91.
49. Constitutional Amendments Seeking to Balance the Budget and Limit Federal
Spending: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 526 (1982) (testimony of Alice Rivlin).

370

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 2:353

we embed the balanced budget rule in the Constitution.so
Finally, a narrower objection has been raised to the requirement of a "super-majority" to waive the amendment. It is quite
possible that a majority would build the coalition needed to waive
the spending restriction by buying the cooperation of other groups,
increasing spending in the process. California has for years required a two-thirds majority of the legislature to approve the annual
budget, without thereby noticeably limiting spending.st

c
The issue of whether we are more helped or hurt by allowing
flexibility to government, and whether the flexibility allowed by this
amendment is adequate, is one for which there is no immediate analytical resolution. Each economist views the world differently, and
in the current state of knowledge there is no ready test of which
view is more accurate.
Of the arguments in favor of the amendment the most promising is the macroeconomic argument advanced by Kydland and
Prescott. Economic decisions made by the public when they know
that government is constrained in its ability to rescue them later will
arguably lead to a better-functioning economy than otherwise. Yet
the argument is advanced within a limited context that neglects
other important social policies, such as a desire to help the afflicted
and the needs of foreign policy. These social policies may require
flexibility of government response, just as the issues Kydland and
Prescott analyze may call for deliberately limiting that flexibility.
Their case is not yet proved.
The "prisoners' dilemma" argument for the amendment may
have merit. Yet it makes sense only if two conditions are met.
First, each person caught in the dilemma must recognize his circumstances and accept the unpleasant truth that he, as well as
everyone else, will have to bind himself to the agreement if anyone
is to benefit from it. Second, those who enter into the agreement
must not be able to make an "end run," abiding by the letter of the
agreement but circumventing its spirit. The escape valve that permits either deficits or increases in the fraction of total income
claimed by government, gives an opportunity for the first condition
to be violated. The opportunity for using tools other than government spending (such as government regulation and tax advantages)
50.
51.

Stein, Discussion, in THE CoNSTITUTION AND THE BUDGET, supra note 31, at 66.
Stubblebine, Balancing the Budget vs. Limiting Spending, in id. at 50.
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to redistribute income gives an opportunity for the second to be
violated.
Identifying the weaknesses in others' panaceas has been among
the most important contributions of economics to policy making.
Economic training equips one to think through unintended consequences of policy proposals. Price ceilings diminish supply, import
restrictions punish exporters, demand suppressed in one market will
pop up in another. Indeed, the greatest contribution of the public
choice literature is to extend the same focus on unintended consequences to include the behavior of government officials and voters.
Those economists who support the balanced budget amendment have not, I think, applied the same discipline to that proposal.
Will those who had the political power to extract benefits from the
rest of society through government spending programs, find their
power eliminated by this amendment? If not, to what alternatives
will they tum? What will be the indirect consequences for the functioning of the government and the economy? I suspect that those
with political power would indeed find other alternatives, and I fear
that the new economic and political distortions could be worse than
the old.

